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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
of the remainder of value. Formerly the limit was eighty percent of
the first ten thousand dollars of value and fifty percent of the re-
mainder.' The total amount which a mutual savings bank can invest
in real estate contracts and mortgages upon real estate has been de-
creased from seventy-five percent to seventy percent of its funds.' A
new section provides that "a mutual savings bank may invest its funds
in bonds or other interest-bearing obligations of corporations not
otherwise ehgible for investment by the savings bank which are
prudent investments for such bank in the opinion of its board of
trustees or of a committee thereof whose action is ratified by such
board at its regular meeting next following such investment." Such
investment may not exceed "fifty percent of the total of its guaranty
fund, undivided profits, and unallocated reserves, or five percent of
its deposits, whichever is less.""
ROBERT L. TAYLOR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional Law-Seizure and Destruction of Obscene Ma-
terials. The 1959 Washington legislature enacted in substance New
York's book-burning statute,' which was held constitutional by the
United States Supreme Court on June 24, 1957, in Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown.'
The Washington statute allows the prosecuting attorney, on behalf
of the state, to maintain an action for an injunction to prevent the sale,
acquisition, distribution, or possession with intent to sell or distribute,
of any writing, record, image or picture, which is obscene, lewd, las-
civious, filthy or indecent, or which contains an article or instrument
of indecent use or purports to be for indecent use or purpose. The
defendant is entitled to jury trial "within a reasonable time after
joinder of issue" and to judgment within two days after conclusion of
the trial. No injunction or restraining order is to be issued prior to
the conclusion of the trial. If the injunction issues, it is to contain
direction to the sheriff for seizure and destruction of the material. The
act expressly declares that it does not apply to certain specified
libraries and museums.
There are three principal differences between the Washington statute
- Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 41, § 4, amending RCW 3220250.
5Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c: 41, § 5, amending RCW 3220.270.
4 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959,.c. 41, § 6.
1 NEW Yo= CODE OF CkMnNAL P aOCm.-E § 22-a.
2 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
3 The statute, here paraphrased, is chapter 105, Session Laws of 1959.
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and the New York statute sustained in the Kingsley case: Under the
Washington statute, the issues tendered by the application for the
injunction are to be tried by a jury rather than by the court, the in-
junction may not issue pendente lite, but only after conclusion of the
trial, and certain libraries and museums are exempt.
The New York statute, by contrast to the Washington statute, con-
templates the issuance of a temporary restraining order pendente lite
and therefore is designed to enable the defendant to get to trial in very
short order, presumably because of the already outstanding injunctive
order, the legality of which is yet to be judicially determined.
The New York statute is summary indeed: "The person... sought
to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues within one day
after joinder of issue.. ." (The Washington statute substitutes "a
reasonable time" for "one day.") In Washington, with the state unable
to get injunctive relief prior to trial, it is not so apparent why the
defendant might want to get such speedy determination of the issues;
rather, it becomes to the state's advantage to pursue the matter assidu-
ously and to receive the judgment of the court within two days after
trial. Yet the Washington statute retains the New York language,
giving the defendant, not the state, the right to the speedy procedure.
In order to appreciate the changes made by the Washington legisla-
ture in its adoption of the New York statute, one must consider the
Kingsley case in detail. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Frankfurter, pointed out first that the defendant did not challenge on
appeal the finding by the lower court that the books involved were
obscene, nor did the defendant claim that New York could not con-
stitutionally "outlaw" obscenity. The defendant's challenge to the
New York law was only that the summary procedure involved, with
its attendant seizure of the books, was a violation of fourteenth amend-
ment due process. To this claim Justice Frankfurter answered that
there is nothing in the fourteenth amendment which restricts New
York in its choice of remedies to only the criminal sanctions enforced
against those who deal in obscenity and if, to enforce its policy, "New
York chooses to... deal with such books as deodands of old,.., it is
not for us to gainsay its selection of remedies."' Justice Frankfurter's
only qualification was that there be opportunity to try the underlying
issue of whether the books are obscene.
The argument was made, however, that this action by New York
4354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
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was "prior restraint," condemned by the doctrine of Near v. Minne-
sota," where the action of the state in restraining a publisher from
issuing any further scandalous publications was held violative of the
fourteenth amendment for interfering with the publisher's freedom
of speech and press at the stage before he had even spoken. To this
argument, Justice Frankfurter answered that really the principal case
was not very much different from Alberts v. California, decided the
same day, where a California obscenity criminal statute was upheld
as applied to a dealer in obscene books. In both New York and Cali-
fornia the power of the state was brought to bear when the book was
on the dealer's shelf, before the public reads the book. Furthermore,
the inhibitions of the injunction of the New York case were, in one
sense, more solicitous of the defendant's welfare than the criminal
sanction of the California case: In the New York case, the defendant
had at least the benefit of a specific injunction before him which he
had to violate before he could be punished by contempt, whereas in
the California criminal case, the seller of the book had to "steer
nervously among the treacherous shoals without the benefit of judi-
cial order or adjudication before he would know with certainty whether
he had brought about the wrath of the state through enforcement of
its criminal law against him. Also, the penalty in the California case
was much more severe than under the New York law: in California,
the defendant was fined $500, sentenced to sixty days in prison, and
put on probation for two years; in New York the defendant simply
was unable to sell certain books, the sheriff taking them for destruction.
To this majority opinion, Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority
opinion in the California case, dissented. He believed that a jury trial
was essential before any book could be constitutionally determined to
be obscene - that obscenity was defined only in terms of community
standards and that the jury was traditionally the only body judicially
capable of making such a determination.
It is to be assumed that this objection by Justice Brennan led the
Washington legislature to provide for the jury trial.'
The dissent of Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, goes to the
5283 U.S. 697 (1931).
6354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7 The quotation, appearing in 354 U.S. at 442, is from Warburg, "Onward and
Upward With The Arts," The New Yorker, April 20, 1957, p. 101.
8 The provision for jury trial is probably valid, despite the strong equity aspects of
the proceeding. Forfeiture of goods was a common law proceeding. See C. J. Hendry
Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943). The usual case for argument has involved an
attempt by the state to remove the jury, with only moderate success. Cases are
collected in notes in Annot, 17 A.L.RL 568 and Annot., 50 A.L.R. 97.
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entire New York scheme, condemning it. Pertinent here is Justice
Douglas' first point - that to allow injunctive relief prior to a judicial
determination of obscenity "gives the State the paralyzing power of
a censor... This is prior restraint and censorship at its worst."9
It is to be assumed that this objection by Justices Douglas and Black
led the Washington legislature to provide that no irjunction was to
issue prior to judgment.
The point of the other dissent, that of Chief Justice Warren, also
expressed to a certain extent by the Douglas-Black dissent, is one not
easily remedied, for it applies as well to the Washington version as to
the New York version of the statute.
The point is this: A state may, as did California in the Alberts case,
define the purveying of obscenity as a crime without violating the
inhibitions of the fourteenth amendment, because such purveying was
"the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for
materials with prurient effect."1 The conduct of the individual is
what is visited with criminal sanction for what he, himself, did; what
he did will, of course, be before the court and jury in the detail of a
particular factual setting, and the question will be, did the defendant's
conduct amount to a dissemination of obscenity? Judged by com-
munity standards, did the defendant in selling or distributing the
particular book to the particular clientele appeal to the "prurient
interest?" In the New York case, by contrast, what is condemned is
not the conduct of the individual at all; rather, it is the article itself
which is stifled, judged without regard to its recipients. In the New
York case, there is no room for even the existence of the book, for
even though it provides that only that possessor who intends to sell
or distribute is subject to the statute, it in actual effect also frustrates
the person who would possess the book without that intent, since under
the statute there would be no one within the state able to sell or dis-
tribute the book to him, even assuming that all he wished to do was
to keep the book on his shelf.
Chief Justice Warren did not like this. He said: "It savors too
much of book burning. I would reverse."'1 Neither did Justices
Douglas and Black; the second point of Justice Douglas' dissent, in
which Justice Black concurred, was substantially the same as Chief
Justice Warren's: "The nature of the group among whom the tracts
9354 U.S. 436, 446 (1957).
10 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957).
11354 U.S. 436, 446 (1957).
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are distributed may have an important bearing on the issue of guilt
in any obscenity prosecution. Yet the present statute makes one crim-
inal conviction conclusive and authorizes a statewide decree that sub-
jects the distributor to the contempt power... Free speech is not to
be regulated like diseased cattle and impure butter." 2
This objection the Washington legislature did not successfuly re-
move. Indeed, really to remove the objection would seemingly require
that there be no such legislation at all. Rather, the Washington legisla-
tion contains a sedative instead of a cure; it simply removes from the
reach of the statute a certain class of possessor and distributor of books
- namely, the libraries. 3 Such exemption from the operation of the
statute is, of course, but a recognition of the fact that while the censor
may with some certainty be able to deny a particular book to one
particular audience, such as to juveniles, that censor is much less able
to say with certainty that no one, not even he, should read the particular
book. The difference is significant. Perhaps there is merit in the par-
ticular publication which the statute would have burned; do as Chief
Justice Warren would do: Curtail its distribution among those who
we think would be harmed by its reading, but at least, do not deny all
of society the benefit, whatever it might be, of one author's work. Book
burning is final and absolute; perhaps we should make some allowance
for the possibility that our censors may make mistakes.
One anomalous feature of this exemption of the library is that it
does not direct the library to keep the publication out of circulation;
yet library administrators, by putting such publications "on reserve"
or in the "manuscript room" or the "vault" do preserve such publica-
tions from theft and to some degree discourage their circulation.
The Washington statute responds to the decision by the Washington
Supreme Court in Adams v. Hinkle," in which Chapter 282 of the
Laws of 1955, the Comic Book Act, was held to violate the inhibitions
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 5 The
12 354 U.S. 436, 447 (1957).
s § 7 of the statute provides: 'Nothing in this act shall apply to any recognized
historical society or museum, the state law library, any county law library, the state
library, the public library, any library of any college or university, or to any archive
or library under the supervision and control of the state, county, municipality, or other
political subdivision."
1"51 Wn2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958). This case has been fully treated in a recent
issue of this review. Bottiger, Freedom of the Press, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 160. The only
points here treated in detail are those which bear upon the Kingsley case and the equal
protection clause.is The statute under discussion is not the only response of the 1959 Legislature to
Adams v. Hinkle; in addition, the criminal obscenity statute, RCW 9.68.010, was
revised to include specific mention of comic books. Chapter 260, Laws of 1959.
(VOL. 34
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principal objections to the 1955 legislation were its license or permit
system for dealers in publications and its very broad and ambiguous
coverage1 6 In addition, the exemption of newspapers from the appli-
cation of the statute was thought by Judge Foster, joined by four
others of the court in the principal opinion, to constitute a denial of
fourteenth amendment equal protection, though the four remaining
members, in a concurring opinion by Judge Finley, disagreed as to
the last basis for decision.
During the course of his opinion Judge Foster discussed the Kings-
ley case, for it had been argued by the attorney general that the de-
cision sanctioned a prior restraint of publications. Ignoring, for the
purpose of discussion, the fact that Kingsley dealt with obscenity as
contrasted to comic books, Judge Foster said that Kingsley was also
to be distinguished from the comic book case in that the restraint
effected in the Kingsley case came much later than the license in the
Comic Book Act, that licensing was the very extreme of control, "in the
seventeenth century mold," and therefore void on its face.
The issue which split the Washington court in the comic book case
may well lead to a similar problem with the present statute; does the
exemption of libraries from the reach of the statute constitute a denial
of equal protection to those who are subject to the statute? In the
comic book case, the exemption of newspapers was held to do so, the
majority opinion saying that when freedom of speech and press were
threatened by legislation assailed as being a denial of equal protection
there was no presumption of constitutionality, Judge Foster quoting
Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette," as follows:
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much
more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much
of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific
16 The invalidity for vagueness was based largely on the holding of Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), in which a New York statute substantially identical to
section (2) of the pre-1959 version of RCW 9.68.010, discussed in note 15, supra, was
held unconstitutional; this section made it criminal to deal in publications ".. devoted
to the publication, or largely made vp of criminal news, police reports, accounts of
criminal deeds, or pictures and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime!; the 1959
Washington Legslature took cognizance of this aspect of Adams v. Hinkle by simply
deleting the entire section (2). Reliance for constitutionality is more safely placed in
the more usual condemning language: "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent,"
words specifically upheld as against a challenge for vagueness in Roth v. United States,354 U.S. 476 (1957). Mr. Bottiger also treats of the vagueness point of Adams v.
Hinkle in his note in 34 WAsH. L. REV. 160 at 164.17 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
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prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to
regulate, for example, a public utility may wel include, so far as the
due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions
which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But free-
doms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be
infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect.
Passing the point, Judge Foster also said that even if the equal pro-
tection clause be considered as independent of the due process clause,
the constitutionality of so classifying those who are subject to the
comic book licensing and those who are not subject is "precarious at
best," citing then several typical equal protection cases."'
To this the concurring opinion of Judge Finley objected, saying that
to him (and to the other three members of the court who joined him)
the classification of newspaper publishers in a different category from
the other publishers and disseminators of comic strips or books could
easily be seen to be based upon reasonable grounds, in view of the
differing audiences which the newspapers and comic books generally
reach. Judge Finley was emphatic that the question of whether a
classification is valid under the fourtenth amendment is wholly separate
from the question whether an act of the state infringes freedom of
speech, and that the criterion under the equal protection clause, for all
types of subject matter, is simply to determine whether the particular
classification could reasonably have been made.
Whether the two different approaches to the application of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the present book-
burning statute would produce a different constitutional result leads
to profitable speculation: If one must find some grave and imminent
danger to a legitimate state interest before the exemption of libraries
in the present statute can be upheld, one might successfully argue the
unconstitutionality of the classification.19 On the other hand, if Judge
Finley's approach be used, it does seem hard to say that there is no
rational ground for exempting the library from the injunctive power of
the statute. If for no other reason, the legislature might well have
thought it best to avoid the finality of burning all the books and to
18 Principal of these are: Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ; State ex rel. Bacich
v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P2d 1101 (1936) ; City of Seattle v. Rogers, 6 Wn2d 31,
106 P2d 598, Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1498 (1940).19 If such a ruling were to be made, the severability section of the statute (§ 8)
might be applied, though it should be questioned whether a ruling that the equal pro-
tection clause was violated would mean that only the exemption was invalid.
[VoL 34
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allow the libraries to retain such publications in order to circulate
them among the historians, sociologists and lawyers of tomorrow, in




The Massachusetts Trust Act of 1959. Chapter 220, Session Laws
of Washington of 1959 is designed to legalize in the State of Washing-
ton the type of business associations known as a "Massachusetts
Trust" or "Business Trust." This type of business association employs
the trust relation for the purpose of conducting a business. Money or
property or both are transferred to trustees under a trust instrument
authorizing them to use such assets to carry on a business for the benefit
of the contributors and their successors in interest. Since the bene-
ficiaries of a trust are not liable for the acts of the trustees, the
beneficiaries achieve the same limited liability as corporate share-
holders have, if trust law applies to the relationship. Beneficial inter-
ests are made freely transferable like corporate shares. The trustees
are liable for their acts, but have a right of reimbursement from the
trust assets for any obligations properly incurred by them. In practice
the trustees endeavor to obtain from third parties with whom they deal
an agreement that such parties will not hold the trustees personally
liable, but will look only to the trust assets.
This type of organization, as its name implies, was first largely
popularized in Massachusetts. It was developed as a substitute for
the corporate form of doing business and in its earlier history was
used to achieve exemption from some of the restraints of corporate
law. In recent years state and federal legislation has been enacted to
deprive the Massachusetts Trust of most, if not all, of those exemp-
tions. Consequently, the motivation for organizing business trusts
has largely disappeared.
While the Massachusetts Trust received quite general legal accept-
ance, such was not the case in the State of Washington. In State ex rel.
Range v. Hinkle and State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine,2 the Washington
Supreme Court held that a "Massachusetts Trust" was a corporation
within the meaning of article XII, section 5 of the state constitution
1 125 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41 (1923).
2 137 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2, 247 Pac. 476 (1926), Annot., 46 A.L.R. 165.
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